Reducing the Slipperiness of Slip and Fall Litigation: Establishing Strict Liability for Hotels by Ebisu, Geneva Wong
Santa Clara Law Review
Volume 25 | Number 3 Article 4
1-1-1985
Reducing the Slipperiness of Slip and Fall
Litigation: Establishing Strict Liability for Hotels
Geneva Wong Ebisu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview
Part of the Law Commons
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Santa Clara Law Review by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Recommended Citation
Geneva Wong Ebisu, Comment, Reducing the Slipperiness of Slip and Fall Litigation: Establishing Strict Liability for Hotels, 25 Santa
Clara L. Rev. 591 (1985).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/lawreview/vol25/iss3/4
COMMENTS
REDUCING THE SLIPPERINESS OF SLIP AND FALL
LITIGATION: ESTABLISHING STRICT LIABILITY
FOR HOTELS
I. INTRODUCTION
"Slip and fall." To those not involved in the legal field this term
may evoke humorous images of a hapless victim in a vaudeville
sketch who slips on a banana peel, skids across the stage and is left
sprawling in front of the audience-with the only real harm being
the injury to his dignity. In real life, however, slip and fall accidents
rarely afford such comic relief; injuries are often quite serious1 and
legal relief, if sought, is often difficult to attain.
Although slip and fall accidents involving business premises are
among the most frequently recurring premises-liability cases, 2 a
plaintiff who decides to bring a tort action against the owner or oc-
cupier of business premises must be aware of the difficult hurdles he
will encounter in presenting his case. The usual claim in slip and
fall cases is based on negligence, which requires an initial determina-
tion that the defendant breached his duty of care toward the plaintiff
and caused of the plaintiff's injury.3
The difficulty with the traditional reliance on the negligence
theory of liability in slip and fall claims is the tremendous proof
burden involved in establishing such a claim- even assuming a duty
on the part of the defendant toward the plaintiff." For instance, in
the banana peel example it will not suffice for the plaintiff to merely
show that he slipped on the banana peel, fell, and was thereby in-
jured.5 In most instances, the plaintiff must establish that the defen-
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1. Falls are the second leading cause of accidental death, ranking behind motor vehicle
fatalities and ahead of fire and burn fatalities. AMERICAN RED CROSS, STANDARD FIRST AID
AND PERSONAL SAFETY 221-22 (2d ed. 1979); PETER ARNOLD, EMERGENCY HANDBOOK 221
(1980).
2. J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY § 7.1 (1976).
3. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 143 (4th ed. 1971).
4. Id. at 385-98.
5. See, e.g., Tyrell v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 392 F.2d 868 (1968).
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dant knew of the existence of the banana peel on the floor6 and
neither remedied the situation nor warned the plaintiff.7 Further, the
mere fact that the plaintiff fell will not necessarily prove that a real
danger in fact existed.' It is usually a question for the fact-finder to
determine if the floor, at the time the plaintiff fell, was truly slippery
enough to have posed a danger.' In short, it is not sufficient for the
plaintiff to prove that he fell on a slippery floor; he must prove that
the floor was "dangerously" slippery.1" Finally, under the compara-
tive negligence theory of liability, if the defendant demonstrates that
the plaintiff was also contributorily negligent, any recovery the
plaintiff may be awarded can be reduced proportionately.11
This comment focuses on one particular category of slip and fall
accidents-those occurring in the bathrooms of hotels-and discusses
the problems that are inherent in bringing a slip and fall claim based
on negligence.12 This category of cases presents situations that justify
lessening the plaintiff's burden of proof. Specifically, in those cases
in which the proprietor of a hotel has failed to provide adequate
safety features that could have prevented the plaintiff's fall, this com-
ment proposes that strict liability constitutes the more appropriate
theory of recovery.
Bathrooms present a grave risk to users because of the slick sur-
faces created by the combination of ceramic and water. 3 Given this
great risk, it is proposed here that a hotel bathroom not equipped
with safety features should be deemed a defective product within the
strict liability context.' The relative paucity of cases involving such
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY § 7.3 (1976); see also infra text
accompanying notes 36-42.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53 (discussion of comparative negligence).
12. For convenience, only the term "hotel" is used in this comment to encompass the
bathrooms of motels and inns as well.
13. The Dep't of Health, Education, and Welfare estimated in 1968 that there were
125,000 injuries involving bathtubs and showers. In a ranking of 32 consumer product catego-
ries based on the absolute frequency of injuries multiplied by their relative severity, as reported
by hospital emergency rooms, injuries involving bathtubs and shower structures ranked eighth
on the list. NATIONAL SAFETY COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT
PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 10, 40 (June, 1970). According to the Na-
tional Safety Council, there were 373 accidental bathtub drownings in 1979. NATIONAL
SAFETY COUNCIL, ACCIDENT FACTS (1983 ed.).
14. The American Red Cross advises the use of safety mats in the bathtub and the
installation of handholds as means of preventing falls in the bathroom. AMERICAN RED CROSS,
STANDARD FIRST AID AND PERSONAL SAFETY 222 (2d. ed. 1979). Also, the National Coin-
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slip and fall claims may attest to the notion that in the past, plain-
tiffs and attorneys have viewed such claims as too difficult to win by
relying on negligence law. The vast number of travelers in the
United States who utilize temporary lodgings, however, makes the
safety standards of hotels a matter of public concern. Imposing strict
liability on owners who fail to install adequate safety measures
would not only deter such conduct, but would also ensure recovery
for the victims.
II. DUTY OF CARE
Prior to 1968, California courts had long held that an owner or
occupier of a business establishment had a responsibility to maintain
his premises in a reasonably safe condition for those patrons defined
as invitees under traditional premises liability theory."B That stan-
dard of care included the duty to make reasonable inspections, to
discover latent defects," and to remedy or warn of those defects;17
when the existing danger was obvious or patent, however, generally
no liability could be attributed to the owner.18 Under that standard
mission on Product Safety found that the designs and surfaces of bathtubs and shower stalls
play a part in many serious falls. NATIONAL SAFETY COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY,
FINAL REPORT PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 35 (June, 1970).
In addition, in California the floors of public showers and public swimming pools are
required to have non-skid surfaces. State Building Code, 24 CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 24, § P909
(e) R.68, No. 41 (1968); Public Swimming Pools, 17 & 24 CAL. ADM. CODE tit. 17, § T17-
7782 R.80, No. 52 (1980). This indicates the State's recognition of the need for some safety
features in showers, even though there is no corresponding provision for motels and hotels.
These safety features that can be utilized in bathrooms are not intended to comprise an
exhaustive list.
15. See, e.g., Cagle v. Bakersfield Medical Group, 110 Cal. App. 2d 77, 241 P.2d 1013
(1952); Clayton v. J.C. Penney Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1960); Crawford v.
Pacific States S. & L. Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 448, 71 P.2d 333 (1937).
Traditional negligence theory uses three categories to determine the status of a person on
the premise of another, and in turn, the duty of care owed to him by the occupier of the land.
Highest on the legal scale is the "invitee" who enters the premises for business purposes con-
cerning the occupier, such as a patron. The occupier of land is under a duty to protect the
patron against dangers that he knows of or should know of. A "licensee" is one who enters the
land with the consent of the occupier, but for his own purposes rather than those of the occu-
pier. Reasonable care must be used to protect the licensee against only those dangers of which
the occupier is aware. A "trespasser" is one who enters the premises without consent. The
traditional rule, modified by some jurisdictions, has been that the occupier is not liable for
injury to the trespasser. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 357-98 (4th ed.
1971).
16. Johnston v. De La Guerra Properties, 28 Cal. 2d 394, 170 P.2d 5 (1947).
17. Crawford v. Pacific States S. & L. Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 448, 449, 71 P.2d 333, 334
(1937).
18. See, e.g., Flores v. Groom Dev. Co., 53 Cal. 2d 347, 348 P.2d 200, 1 Cal. Rptr. 840
(1959); Crawford v. Pacific States S. & L. Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 448, 71 P.2d 333, 334 (1937).
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the occupier was not treated as an insurer of such invitees, 9 and the
mere occurrence of injury on his premises to an invitee would not
create a presumption of negligence on the part of the possessor.2
The rule was that in order to impose liability on an owner, an invi-
tee needed to show that the owner had knowledge of the condition or
that the condition had existed for such a time that it was the duty of
the owner to know of it.
2 1
With the landmark case of Rowland v. Christian2 2 in 1968,
California discarded the common law system of determining an
owner or occupier's duty towards an entrant according to the indi-
vidual's classification as either an invitee, licensee or trespasser. 8 In
so doing, the California Supreme Court elevated the degree of care
traditionally owed licensees to that owed invitees, and thus adopted a
single duty of reasonable care for possessors of land. 4 The proper
test for determining the liability of the possessor, the court stated, is
whether he has acted as a reasonable person in the management of
his property in view of the probability of injury to others.26 The
court stated that although the facts giving rise to the plaintiff's status
as trespasser, licensee, or invitee "may have some bearing on the
question of liability, the status is not determinative. ' 26 Thus negli-
gence could be found if an occupier of land failed to warn of, or
failed to repair a concealed condition that involved an unreasonable
risk of harm to those he knew were about to come in contact with it
provided the occupier was aware of the concealed condition. 27 Conse-
quently, the standard of "reasonable" care owed business guests by a
business proprietor under the old classification system remained
unchanged.8
An innkeeper's duty of care towards his guests is the same stan-
dard as that applied to the owner of any business establishment. It is
19. Crawford v. Pacific States S. & L. Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 448, 449, 71 P.2d 333, 334
(1937).
20. Id.
21. 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 119, 443 P.2d at 568, 70 Cal. Rptr. at 104.
26. Id.
27. Id. The court also noted that the same result could have been reached by an expan-
sion of the term "invitee" to include all persons invited upon the land. Id. at 120, P.2d at 569,
Cal Rptr. at 105.
28. See, e.g., Beauchamp v. Los Gatos Golf Course, 273 Cal. App. 2d 20, 25, 77 Cal.
Rtptr. 914, 918 (1969) (court holding that the traditional legal duties declared to exist in favor
of an invitee have not been jettisoned by Rowland).
[Vol. 25
1985] HOTEL STRICT LIABILITY
an innkeeper's duty to exercise reasonable care in maintaining his
hotel in a reasonably safe condition,2 9 to make reasonable inspec-
tions,8" and to remedy or warn of latent defects. 1 The proprietor of
an inn has a corresponding right to assume that his guests will per-
ceive those dangers that should be obvious through ordinary intelli-
gence and experience.32
III. THE SLIPPERINESS OF SLIP AND FALL LITIGATION
A. Slip and Fall Claims in General
While the duty of care owed by the owner of a business estab-
lishment to his guests is a question of law,"3 the more difficult issues
are those of fact and are thus determined by a jury. 4 The plaintiff
must present substantial evidence on many issues in order to avoid a
directed verdict for the defendant.3 5 The difficulties presented by
these proof requirements under ordinary negligence law are
numerous.
The mere fact that the plaintiff slipped on the floor of a busi-
ness establishment, whether due to a foreign substance on the floor
or due to the floor's inherently slippery characteristics, will not suf-
fice to prove that the floor was in fact in a "dangerous condition" at
the time of the accident." Additionally, even if a plaintiff is able to
prove that the condition of the floor was "dangerous," he must still
29. See, e.g., Trembley v. Capital Co., 89 Cal. App. 2d 606, 201 P.2d 398 (1949);
Wallace v. Speier, 60 Cal. App. 2d 387, 140 P.2d 900 (1943); Adams v. Dow Hotel, 25 Cal.
App. 2d 51, 76 P.2d 210 (1938); Crawford v. Pacific States S. & L. Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 448,
71 P.2d 333 (1937).
30. See, e.g., Trembley v. Capital Co., 89 Cal. App. 2d 606, 201 P.2d 398 (1949).
31. Crawford v. Pacific States S. & L. Co., 22 Cal. App. 2d 448, 71 P.2d 333 (1937).
Most cases have held that an owner is not liable for an injury to an invitee that was due to a
patent defect or to a latent defect of which he had no knowledge and could not have discovered
by reasonable inspection. See, e.g., Adams v. Dow Hotel, 25 Cal. App. 2d 51, 76 P.2d 210
(1938); Trembley v. Capital Co., 89 Cal. App. 2d 606, 201 P.2d 398 (1949).
32. See, e.g., Early v. John A. Cooper Co., 304 F. Supp. 906 (1969). The policy of that
rule is that patent defects can be imputed to the knowledge of the invitee. See Neuber v. Royal
Realty Co., 86 Cal. App. 2d 596, 195 P.2d 501 (1948).
33. See generally J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY §§ 7.1-7.13 (1976).
34. Id.
35. Id. Those issues include: 1) whether the condition was dangerous, 2) whether the
dangerous condition was latent or patent, 3) whether the defendant had knowledge of the
dangerous condition, 4) whether the defendant exercised due care in inspecting the premises, in
repairing defects that were discovered or should have been discovered, and in warning of latent
defects, 5) whether the dangerous condition was the proximate cause of the plaintiff"s injury,
6) whether the plaintiff exercised due care in his actions, and 7) the amount of damages, if
any, plaintiff should be awarded. Id.
36. Id. at § 7.3.
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prove that it was dangerous at the time he fell.87 When the danger-
ous condition was caused by an isolated or unexpected danger or
defect, evidence may not be readily available because of the transi-
tory nature of the danger or defect. Even if the dangerous condition
was an inherent characteristic of the floor, proof of this issue may
necessitate expert scientific testimony.38
Among the most common slip and fall claims brought are those
involving injuries to a plaintiff after slipping on an allegedly
overwaxed floor of a business establishment.3 9 Even if evidence is
presented that the floor in question was recently waxed prior to the
plaintiff's fall, it still remains a question of fact as to the degree of
danger.40 As the court in Cagle v. Bakersfield Medical Group41
stated, "[S]lipperiness is an elastic term. From the fact that a floor is
slippery it does not necessarily result that it is dangerous to walk
upon. It is the degree of slipperiness that determines whether the
condition is reasonably safe. '"4 2 This question depends upon jury de-
termination of the facts; therefore, findings can be inconsistent in
similar factual situations.
Claims based on the traditional negligence formula also require
a determination that the defendant had either actual or constructive
knowledge of the dangerous condition of the premises.43 Knowledge
on the part of the defendant can be proven by evidence indicating
that: 1) the defendant created the dangerous condition; 2) the defen-
dant knew of the creation of the dangerous condition; or 3) the dan-
gerous condition existed long enough that knowledge of its existence
could reasonably be imputed to the defendant. 4' Because evidence of
actual knowledge is usually difficult to obtain, plaintiffs will gener-
ally attempt to show constructive knowledge. This is an especially
difficult hurdle for a plaintiff in a slip and fall action to overcome
given the generally temporary nature of the problem.45 The plaintiff
37. Id. at § 7.2 (1976).
38. Spencer, Coefficients of Friction in Slip and Fall Accidents, CTLJ 49 (Fall 1973)
(discussion of the necessity of measuring friction coefficients in slip and fall cases).
39. See, e.g., Clayton v. J. C. Penney Co., 186 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8 Cal. Rptr. 712 (1960);
Scribner v. Bertmann, 129 Cal. App. 2d 204, 276 P.2d 697 (1954); Cagle v. Bakersfield Medi-
cal Group, 110 Cal. App. 2d 77, 241 P.2d 1013 (1952).
40. Id.
41. 110 Cal. App. 2d 77, 241 P.2d 1013 (1952).
42. Id. at 81, 241 P.2d at 1015 (quoting Nicola v. P.G.&E. Co., 50 Cal. App. 2d 612,
615-16, 123 P.2d 531, 599 (1942).
43. See, e.g., Scott v. Alpha Beta Co., 104 Cal. App. 3d 305, 163 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1980).
44. Id. See also Douglass, Torts-Slip and Fall-Theories of Recovery, 33 J. OF AIR
LAW & COMMERCE 171 (1967).
45. See supra text following note 37.
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risks a directed verdict or a nonsuit if he is unable to produce evi-
dence of either actual knowledge, or of facts sufficient to show that
knowledge could be imputed."6
Furthermore, because the duty of the proprietor of a business
establishment is defined in broad terms of "reasonableness,"" 7 triers
of fact are given the discretion to find that the defendant's conduct
was reasonable even if there is evidence of a dangerous condition and
of the defendant's knowledge of such a condition.' 8 In short, the
plaintiff is thus faced with an exceedingly burdensome proof prob-
lem in establishing negligence, and the outcome is uncertain and im-
possible to predict.' 9
Compounding the severity of the requirements that must be met
in building a prima facie case is the variety of defenses available to
the defendant. The defendant will in most cases claim that he has
exercised reasonable care in the maintenance of his establishment
and that the premises are reasonably safe. He may argue that he had
no knowledge of the alleged condition or that even if the condition
was dangerous it was obvious, and thus the plaintiffs own negli-
gence was the cause of his injury. Moreover, a defendant may claim
that even if the alleged condition existed, it was not dangerous nor
was it the cause in fact of the plaintiff's injury.
Even if the plaintiff successfully develops his claim of negli-
gence and counteracts all defenses of the defendant, he may still en-
counter a partial bar to his recovery under the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence.5" This doctrine, which was adopted by the California
Supreme Court in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.,"' attempts to allocate re-
sponsibility and liability for the damage among the parties in direct
proportion to the respective party's negligence." Thus, although the
contributory negligence of a plaintiff in an action for negligence no
longer bars his recovery, the amount of damages awarded is dimin-
ished in direct proportion to the jury-determined amount of a plain-
46. See, e.g., Frank v. J. C. Penney Co., Inc. 133 Cal. App. 2d 123, 283 P.2d 291
(1955) (nonsuit affirmed).
47. See supra text accompanying note 15.
48. See e.g., Adams v. Dow Hotel, 25 Cal. App. 2d 31, 76 P.2d 210 (1938).
49. Showing causation is generally less of a problem. If the plaintiff is able to identify a
condition that could have caused the slip at a time and place concurrent with plaintiff's fall, it
will usually be sufficient to support an inference that the c6ndition was a cause-in-fact of the
fall. See J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY § 7.2 (1976).
50. Scott v. Alpha Beta Co., 104 Cal. App. 3d 305, 163 Cal. Rptr. 544 (1980).
51. 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
52. Id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
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tiff's negligence."
In summary, a slip and fall cause of action based on negligence
is difficult to maintain. Problems of proof, the availability of de-
fenses, and the doctrine of comparative negligence all operate as dis-
incentives to bringing such a suit. These problems are compounded
when a plaintiff suffers a slip and fall injury in a hotel bathroom.
B. Slip and Fall Injuries Occurring in Hotel Bathrooms
1. Claims Based on Negligence
Several factors peculiar to slip and fall claims involving motel or
hotel bathrooms render recovery additionally difficult under ordinary
negligence law. The most important distinction relates to the fact
that these accidents often occur before few, if any, witnesses.54 This
tends to make it extremely difficult for the plaintiff to prove that the
dangerous condition actually existed, 55 or that it existed for such an
extended period of time that constructive notice should be imputed to
the defendant.5 1 It is also likely that the defendant will claim that
the plaintiff created the dangerous condition himself.
Falls in the bathroom are often the result of a person slipping
on a wet area such as the floor, the bathtub, or the shower. As wet-
ness is an inherent characteristic of bathrooms, defendants may claim
that such a danger was apparent and therefore the ensuing injury
was the result of the plaintiff's own negligence. 57 The intrinsic logic
of such an argument may overshadow other equally plausible argu-
ments. In spite of the many injuries every year, the dangerous nature
of bathrooms arguably may not be readily obvious as many people
use them every day without injury. "8 Alternatively, if the danger is
obvious, a negligence claim supports the proposition that hotel bath-
rooms should be required to have adequate safety features because
hotel patrons are usually not familiar with the hotel bathrooms prior
to using them and may be less aware of the extent of the particular
53. Id.
54. See generally Annot., 93 A.L.R. 3d 258 (discussion regarding the proof problems of
cases involving hotel defects).
55. See supra text accompanying notes 36-42.
56. See supra text accompanying notes 43-46.
57. See, e.g., Miller v. Shull, 48 So. 2d 521 (Fla. 1950). See also text accompanying
notes 50-53 regarding comparative negligence.
58. See Lincoln Operating Co. v. Gillis, 114 N.E.2d 873, 876 (Ind. 1953) (stating that
"[w]hile it is a matter of common experience that water makes an enamel or porcelain tub
more slippery than a dry tub, it is also a matter of common experience that millions of people
take baths in such tubs without ever falling or injuring themselves.").
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risks.
The difficulties in proving a claim based on negligence have re-
sulted in some seemingly inconsistent outcomes in cases involving ho-
tel bathrooms. In one case, the owner of a hotel was found not liable
for injuries sustained by the plaintiff when the porcelain handle of
the bathroom hot water faucet broke in his hand, even though the
court acknowledged that the bathroom had not been maintained in a
reasonably safe condition.59 In a similar case, however, a hotel owner
was found liable for injuries suffered by a patron who fell in the
shower after being hit by a spray of water when the faucet assembly
came off the wall.00
The many hurdles a plaintiff must confront in any slip and fall
action thus become virtually insurmountable barriers when the claim
results from a fall suffered in a hotel bathroom. It may be surmised
that attorneys often advise plaintiffs injured in these kinds of situa-
tions to forego pursuing their claims or to expect less than adequate
compensation. However, such discouragement should not be accepted
as the natural consequence of a person's attempt to seek relief for a
genuine claim. A better alternative lies in urging the court to utilize
a more appropriate formula for determining fault.
2. Claims Based on Statutory Violation
The enactment of legislation requiring that hotels install non-
skid flooring, safety bars, and handholds would not alone obviate the
difficulties that a slip and fall plaintiff encounters in proving his
case. Although a hotel owner would be presumed to have failed to
exercise due care if he violated such a statute, ordinance, or regula-
tion,6" his liability is not deemed absolute6 2 but rather negligence per
se. 6" Consequently, the defenses ordinarily available in negligence
59. Adams v. Dow Hotel, 25 Cal. App. 2d 51, 76 P.2d 210 (1938). The court held that
the defendant had nevertheless exercised due care in inspecting for defects. Id.
60. Wallace v. Speir, 60 Cal. App. 2d 387, 140 P.2d 900 (1943) (court found that the
defect amounted to a lack of repair and distinguished the case from Adams).
61. CAL. EvID. CODE § 669 (a)(1) (Deering 1967). A plaintiff basing his tort claim on
a hotel owner's violation of a safety statute would need to show that the statute was enacted to
protect a class of persons, of which he is a member, against the type of harm that he suffered
as a result of a violation. See, e.g., Veseley v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 496 P.2d 151, 95 Cal.
Rptr. 623 (1971).
62. Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947); Ma-
son v. Case, 220 Cal. App. 2d 170, 33 Cal. Rptr. 710 (1963).
63. Casey by Casey v. Russell, 138 Cal. App. 3d 319, 188 Cal. Rptr. 18 (1982); Levels
v. Growers Ammonia Supply Co., 121 Cal. App. 3d 443, 121 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1975) (negli-
gence per se is a rebuttable presumption of duty and breach of duty only).
19851
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25
suits of comparative negligence and assumption of the risk are still
available to the defendant," and the plaintiff is still faced with the
difficult proof problems of most slip and fall suits as discussed above.
IV. THE DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY
A. The Purposes of Strict Liability
The most common application of the doctrine of strict liability
to premises-liability cases are those instances in which the entrants
were injured as a result of either "ultrahazardous" or "abnormally
dangerous" activities conducted on the premises.65 Although an argu-
ment could be made that one's use of a bathroom in a hotel that has
not been equipped with adequate safety features66 constitutes an "ul-
trahazardous" or "abnormally dangerous activity," this argument is
most likely untenable.
67
In spite of the limitations imposed by the traditional applica-
tions of strict liability to premises-liability cases, an owner of a hotel
should still be held strictly liable if a guest is injured in a fall in the
bathroom that could have been prevented if particular safety devices
had been provided. The liability theory that should be applied in
these cases is strict liability in tort under a products liability analysis.
The doctrine of strict products liability in California provides
that manufacturers and other persons in the chain of distribution6"
64. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 200-01 (4th ed. 1971).
65. See generally J. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES LIABILITY §§ 170-77, 8.10-8.19
(1976); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 492-540 (4th ed. 1971). Strict
liability is also applied if the entrant was injured by a wild or domestic animal on the prem-
ises. Id. at 496-503.
In the line of cases involving ultrahazardous or abnormally dangerous activities, two rules
of liability have emerged. One rule is that a possessor of land is held liable when "he damages
another by a thing or activity unduly dangerous and inappropriate to the place where it is
maintained, in light of the character of that place and its surroundings." W. PROSSER at 508.
The other rule limits the application of strict liability for a possessor of land to those cases
which involve "ultrahazardous" activities, that is, those activities which "necessarily involve a
risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be eliminated by the
exercise of the utmost care," and are "not a matter of common usage." Id. at 512. The usual
examples cited as abnormally dangerous or ultrahazardous activities include blasting and the
storage of explosives. Id. at 512-13.
66. Such features might include non-skid surfacing on the floor, non-skid surfacing in
the shower or tub, and handrails for the shower or tub. See supra note 14.
67. Common sense indicates that most courts would be unlikely to find a parallel be-
tween blasting and bathing. See supra note 65.
68. The following cases found that entities other than manufacturers were integral com-
ponents of the enterprises that placed the alleged defective products on the market and thus
were within the doctrine of strict liability: Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 420 (1970) (a licensee); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 71 Cal.
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are liable without regard to fault when they place an article on the
market which they know is to be used without inspection for defects,
and the product proves to have a defect that causes injury. 69 It is also
required that the product was being used in the manner in which it
was intended when the injury occurred." Therefore, if a vendor is in
the business of selling a product and that product is in a defective
condition and causes physical harm to a user, the vendor is held
strictly liable for the resulting injuries.71 Most importantly, the ap-
plication of the doctrine does not require either the transfer of title to
the goods or an actual sale. 2
The justifications for imposing strict liability are to encourage
manufacturers to provide safer products and to insure that the costs
of injuries are borne by manufacturers and vendors rather than the
injured persons. This latter objective is based on the rationale that
those who place the product into the stream of commerce are better
able to absorb the cost, discover defects, reduce the hazards inherent
in the product, and to allocate the risks through insurance.73
Rptr. 306 (1969) (a wholesale-retail distributor); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal.
App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969) (a developer); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equipment
Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337 (1969) (a lessor); Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964) (a retailer).
69. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal.
Rptr. 697 (1963); Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 331, 79 Cal. Rptr.
194 (1969).
70. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64 377 P.2d 897, 900, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963).
71. Id. Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr.
896 (1964).
72. See, e.g., Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184
Cal. Rptr. 89 (1982) (passenger on city bus brought strict liability action against manufacturer
of bus).
73. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 641-62 (4th ed.
1971). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment c (1965), which states
as follows:
On whatever theory, the justification for strict products liability has been
said to be that the seller, by marketing his product for use and consumption, has
undertaken and assumed a special responsibility toward any member of the con-
suming public who may be injured by it; that the public has the right to and
does expect, in the case of products which it needs and for which it is forced to
rely upon the seller, that reputable sellers will stand behind their goods; that
public policy demands that the burden of accidental injuries caused by products
intended for consumption be placed upon those who market them, and be
treated as a cost of production against which liability insurance can be obtained;
and that the consumer of such products is entitled to the maximum of protection
at the hands of someone, and the proper persons to afford it are those who
market the products.
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B. Appropriateness of Using Strict Liability in Hotel Bathroom
Cases
Products liability case law unequivocally permits a plaintiff to
recover damages when his injury results from a defendant's failure to
provide an appropriate safety device for his product.74 A strict liabil-
ity action is particularly appropriate when the injury that occurred is
precisely the sort of injury that a safety device can be designed to
prevent.75 Applying this analysis, it can be strongly argued that
when a hotel proprietor leases a room without adequate safeguards
in the bathroom, he is leasing a "defective product. '7 6
In California, the scope of the strict products liability doctrine
has been expanded to include all those engaged in the business of
distributing a good to the public as an integral part of the overall
producing and marketing enterprise.7 Following this approach,
landlords who are in the business of leasing apartments have been
found within the scope of the doctrine as lessors of defective furni-
ture and appliances.7 8 Most recently, in Becker v. IRM Corpora-
tion 79 the court held that a landlord should be held strictly liable for
the injuries of a tenant that were caused by a latent defect on the
premises that existed at the time when the premises were let.80
The California Supreme Court had previously formulated this
concept in Green v. Superior Court,81 stating that in most significant
respects, the modern urban tenant is in the same position as any
74. See, e.g., Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184
Cal Rptr. 891 (1982) (bus manufacturer found liable because city bus lacked guardrail);
Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972) (liability found
because lawn mower had unguarded opening to blade); Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d
756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970) (motel found liable because swimming pool had
neither lifeguard nor warning); McNeil v. Yellow Cab Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d 116, 147 Cal.
Rptr. 733 (1978) (taxi company could be liable because seat belt not visible to passenger).
75. Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 124, 649 P.2d 224, 231, 184
Cal. Rptr. 891, 898 (1982).
76. See infra text accompanying notes 104-111 (discussion of "product" and "defect").
77. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 464 (1985); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,
61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964).
78. See, e.g., Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 101 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1972)
(defective furniture); Golden v. Conway, 55 Cal. App. 3d 948, 955, 128 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976)
(defective wall heater).
79. 38 Cal. 3d 454 (1984).
80. The plaintiff was injured by a defective shower door; the California Supreme Court
found that the defendant was in the business of leasing apartments and thus was an integral
part of the marketing enterprise by which the shower door in question reached the user. Id. at
464. (The court specifically refused to address the issue of whether strict liability would apply
to a disclosed defect. Id. at 469 n.4).
81. 10 Cal. 3d 616, 627, 517 P.2d 1168, 1175, 111 Cal. Rptr. 704, 711 (1974).
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other normal consumer of goods in that a tenant seeks to "purchase"
housing from a landlord for a specific period of time. The court
noted that the landlord who "sells" housing enjoys a much greater
opportunity, incentive and capacity to inspect and maintain the con-
dition of his apartment building than does a tenant. The court found,
therefore, that a tenant may reasonably expect that the product he is
purchasing is fit for the purpose for which it is obtained, i.e., as a
living unit.82
The analysis articulated by the court in Green and followed in
Becker provides a sound basis for treating the proprietor of a hotel as
a "retailer" who should be subject to liability for defects in the
rented premises. Just as an apartment landlord is in the business of
leasing apartments, appliances, and furniture for furnished apart-
ments, a hotel owner is in the business of leasing rooms and furnish-
ings. Like the apartment landlord, the hotel owner is a vital link in
the commercial chain, directly profits from the consumer's use of
products provided as part of the rental unit,"3 and is an integral part
of the marketing enterprise by which those products reach the
public.8 4
The policy considerations advanced in support of strict products
liability are also applicable to cases involving falls that occur in hotel
bathrooms that are not equipped with recognized and readily availa-
ble safety features.85 The owner of the hotel is best able to absorb
the cost of injury to a guest as he may purchase insurance to protect
himself from such a loss.8" Furthermore, the owner is the one who
can, and should, remedy the defect by installing safety devices be-
cause the consumer has neither the opportunity nor the authority to
do so. 8 ' Finally, because the owner should know that the bathroom
is to be used by guests without inspection, he should be under an
obligation to provide a bathroom equipped with proper safeguards.88
Strict liability does not confer absolute liability upon a defen-
82. Id.
83. Becker v. IRM Corp. 144 Cal. App. 3d 321, 332, 192 Cal. Rptr. 570, 577 (1983),
affd, 38 Cal. 3d 454 (1985).
84. See supra text accompanying note 73.
In addition, the National Commission on Product Safety in its report to the President and
Congress has recommended that the doctrine of strict liability be "applied uniformly in State
and Federal courts to enable a consumer injured by a product in defective condition to obtain
fair compensation." NATIONAL COMMISSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FINAL REPORT
PRESENTED TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 118 (June 1970).
85. See supra text accompanying note 69.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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dant, 9 and the defendant does not necessarily become the insurer of
the safety of the product.9" The plaintiff must still demonstrate that
a defect in the product proximately caused the injury.9 Nevertheless,
the use of the doctrine provides many sound legal advantages over
the use of ordinary negligence law in slip and fall claims involving
hotel bathrooms. The major benefit of utilizing the strict liability
doctrine in these claims is that, in line with the purpose of the doc-
trine, the injured plaintiff is relieved of "many of the onerous evi-
dentiary burdens inherent in a negligence cause of action."92 Negli-
gence of the defendant need not be proven93 and the defendant's
proof of due care will not absolve him of liability if the product was
defective and the plaintiff was injured by it.94 Another extremely im-
portant benefit is that in some cases, once the plaintiff makes a
prima facie showing of proximate causation, the burden of proof will
shift to the defendant to prove the product was not defective.9" In
addition, the use of the doctrine is not limited to latent product de-
fects, but also extends to patent defects.96
C. Application of Strict Liability
1. Identification of the "Product"
The plaintiff bringing a claim based on strict liability must be
able to identify the product and the defect that caused the injury.97
Because the rule of product liability law in California is not confined
to products that are inherently or unreasonably dangerous, arguably
the "product" named in a products liability case involving a fall in a
hotel bathroom could be a fixture within the bathroom or it could be
the bathroom as a unit.98 A bathroom fixture is a "product" just as
89. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 733, 575 P.2d 1162, 1166, 144
Cal. Rptr. 384 (1978).
90. Id. See also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 132, 501 P.2d 1153,
1161-62 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 441-42 (1972).
91. Id. at 130, 501 P.2d at 1160, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 440.
92. Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 119, 649 P.2d 224, 228 184
Cal. Rptr. 891, 895 (1982).
93. See Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 434, 573 P.2d 443, 457,
143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239 (1978).
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 144-45, 501 P.2d 1163, 1169, 104 Cal. Rptr.
443, 449 (1972).
97. See generally W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 656-76 (4th ed.
1971).
98. Whereas the applications of strict liability in tort to premises liability cases generally
involve only activities that are "abnormally dangerous" or "ultrahazardous," strict liability as
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defective furniture and appliances have previously been deemed to be
"products." 99 Alternatively, the bathroom as a whole can be consid-
ered a product because products liability law has been extended to
encompass articles other than chattels. This extension has included
buildings and parts of buildings that contain defective components.100
In Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc.,01 the court held that a home-
owner was entitled to recover on the basis of strict liability for dam-
age caused by the failure of a radiant heating system in a home con-
structed by the defendants. The court noted that the defendants were
engaged in the mass production and sale of homes and that the
plaintiff had relied on the defendant's skill in producing a home with
a heating system that was reasonably fit for its intended purpose.' 2
An analogy can thus be drawn between defective bathrooms and
their fixtures, and the defective furniture, appliances, and compo-
nents of apartments and homes.
2. Proving the "Defect"
California cases have articulated three different tests for estab-
lishing whether a product was in a defective condition within the
strict liability framework. If any one of the tests is met, the product
is deemed "defective." First, a product may be found to be defective
if an error occurred in the manufacturing process.1 08 Second, a prod-
uct may be found to have a defect in design if it failed to perform as
a rule of product liability law in California is not confined to products that are "inherently" or
"unreasonably" dangerous. See Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 331,
337-38, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194, 197 (1969).
See also Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(1972) (rejected the approach taken by the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1)
(1965) which states as follows: "One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasona-
bly dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical
harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property.
99. See supra text accompanying note 78.
100. See, e.g., Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc. 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749
(1969). See also infra text accompanying note 97.
101. Id.
102. Id. Although strict liability had not yet been extended to include sales of real es-
tate, the court's view was that no meaningful distinction exists between the mass production
and sale of homes and the mass production and sale of automobiles, the latter of which are
within the law of strict liability. Id. at 227, 74 Cal. Rptr. at 752.
Furthermore, products liability law has supplanted the old distinctions drawn between a
product and the container in which'it is sold, with the view that such a product is sold as an
integrated whole. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 99 (4th ed. 1971).
Therefore, a bathroom should be considered as an integrated unit.
103. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Superior Court, 243 Cal. App. 2d 710, 52 Cal. Rptr. 592
(1966). See generally W. PROSSER at §§ 75-81.
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safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in a reason-
ably foreseeable manner.10 4 Finally, a product may be found to have
a defect in design, even if it satisfies ordinary consumer expectations,
if the jury determines that the product's design embodies "excessive
preventable danger."' ° Under the last test, once the plaintiff makes
a prima facie showing that the injury was proximately caused by the
product's design, the burden shifts to the defendant to prove that the
product is not defective. 00 In applying those tests to slip and fall
claims in the hotel bathroom context, an attorney must analyze the
facts of each case to determine the most appropriate test under which
to argue that a defective product exists.
If the product was designed to include a safety feature which
was negligently omitted in the manufacturing process, it would ap-
pear that there is a clear "defect" under the first test outlined.10 7 For
example, if a shower stall was designed to have non-skid surfacing
which was omitted in the manufacturing process, or if a safety mat
had suction cups that were improperly manufactured and thus failed
to grip properly, those would constitute "defects."
It may also be argued in other instances that the bathroom was
defectively designed because it failed to perform as safely as an ordi-
nary consumer would expect.'0" That argument is based on the con-
tention that an ordinary consumer would expect that a hotel bath-
room would be equipped with safety features that could adequately
prevent falls. An argument may also be made that the bathroom,
104. Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 426-27, 573 P.2d 443, 452, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 234 (1978). •
See also Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 891 (1982), wherein the court stated that "the jury considers the expectations of a hypo-
thetical reasonable consumer, rather than those of the particular plaintiff in the case." Id. at
126 n.6, 649 P.2d at 233 n.6, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 900 n.6. This standard reflects a warranty
analysis and is based on the theory that when a manufacturer places a product on the market,
a representation is impliedly made that the product is safe for the tasks it was designed to
accomplish. Id. at 118, 649 P.2d at 227, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 894.
105. "Excessive preventable danger" is found when the risk of danger inherent in the
challenged design outweighs the benefit of such design. Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32
Cal. 3d 112, 118, 649 P.2d 224, 227, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891, 894 (1982).
106. Id. at 119, 649 P.2d at 228, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 895. The jury may take into consid-
eration the gravity of the danger posed by the challenged design; the likelihood that such dan-
ger would occur; the mechanical feasibility of a safer alternative design; the financial cost of an
improved design; and, the adverse consequences to the product and to the consumer that would
result from an alternative design. Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 120 Cal.
App. 3d 842, 854, 175 Cal. Rptr. 67, 74 (1981) (quoting Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 420, 143 Cal.
Rptr. at 237, 573 P.2d at 455).
107. See supra text accompanying note 103.
108. See supra text accompanying note 104.
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even if it satifies ordinary consumer expectations, is defective because
the benefits of the bathroom as is do not outweigh the preventable
dangers.' 09 Although an owner is likely to advance the argument
that it is better to provide the hotel bathroom without additional
safety devices than to increase the rental rates, an opposing argument
can be made that the installation of adequate safety devices works to
the economic advantage of the owner, if one considers that he may be
able to reduce the cost of insurance by reducing the likelihood of
accidents." 0 Additionally, the costs of installing the safety features
could be spread over a period of time. It would, therefore, appear
that the risk of danger inherent in bathrooms without safety devices
in most cases would far outweigh the costs and minor difficulties
involved in installing safety features."'
3. The Causation Factor
The California Supreme Court has stated that a defective prod-
uct claim based on the lack of a safety device presents a factual issue
which is merely the projection of our habit of expecting certain con-
sequences to follow certain antecedents; 1 2 a plaintiff in a strict lia-
bility action is not required to disprove every possible alternative ex-
planation of the cause of the injury in order to have the case
submitted to the jury."' Consequently, in a strict liability claim one
would not need to prove with certainty that the presence of a partic-
ular safety feature in a hotel bathroom would have prevented the
plaintiff's fall, nor would the plaintiff be required to disprove all
other possible explanations for his accident. Common knowledge and
experience should afford a sufficient basis for concluding that it is
more likely than not that the absence of a safety feature played a
109. See supra text accompanying notes 106-107.
110. Reducing the likelihood of accidents could also work to increase the proprietor's
goodwill among his customers.
111. In addition to proving that the product was defective, the plaintiff must also estab-
lish that the defective condition was in existence at the time the motel or hotel room was
rented. See Priessman v. Ford Motor Co., I Cal. App. 3d 841, 852, 82 Cal. Rptr. 108, 114
(1969); Tresham v. Ford Motor Co., 275 Cal. App. 2d 403, 410, 79 Cal. Rptr. 883, 887
(1969); Erickson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 240 Cal. App. 2d 793, 798, 50 Cal. Rptr. 143, 146
(1966). In the case of removable safety devices, then, the plaintiff would need to show that
they were never provided by the proprietor so as to refute any charges that the plaintiff re-
moved them prior to his accident.
112. Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 120, 649 P.2d 224, 229, 284
Cal. Rptr. 891, 896 (1982) (quoting W. Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L.
REV. 369, 382-383 (1950)).
113. Id. at 121, 649 P.2d at 229, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 896.
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significant part in the accident."14
It is incumbent upon the plaintiff in a strict liability action,
however, to prove that he was injured while using the product in the
manner in which it was intended to be used."' Nevertheless, the
defendant is required to anticipate "usual uses," misuses, and abuses
of the product which are reasonably forseeable," 6 and to take rea-
sonable precautions to either minimize the harm that may result
from such misuse, 1  or to warn against anticipated "unusual"
uses. 1 8 In applying those standards to a slip and fall claim that oc-
curred in the bathroom of a motel or hotel that lacked adequate
safety features, the plaintiff would need to prove only that he was
injured while using the bathroom in a reasonably foreseeable man-
ner,"1 9 and that his injury was proximately caused by the lack of
certain safety devices.'2
4. Implications of a Warning
It has been found in some cases that no liability should be im-
puted to the defendant if he has given a warning or directions that, if
heeded, would have defused the dangerousness of the product. 2 ' Do
these cases suggest that a motel or hotel proprietor need only post a
sign stating, for instance, that the bathtub is dangerously slippery
114. Id. at 120, 649 P.2d at 229, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 896 (1982). Because the use of
bathrooms is within the common experience of consumers, it will probably suffice if the plain-
tiff provides evidence concerning his use of the bathroom, the circumstances surrounding the
slip and fall, and the objective features of the bathroom that are relevant to an evaluation of its
safety; expert testimony would probably not be required. See id at 120-22, 649 P.2d at 229-31,
184 Cal. Rptr. at 896-98.
115. Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 64, 337 P.2d 897, 901, 27
Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1962); Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 89, 91
Cal. Rptr, 301, 305 (1970).
116. Dosier v. Wilcox-Crittendon Co., 45 Cal. App. 3d 74, 78, 119 Cal. Rptr. 135, 136
(1975); Johnson v. Standard Brands Paint Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 331, 341, 79 Cal. Rptr. 194,
199 (1969).
117. Self v. General Motors Corp., 42 Cal. App. 3d 1, 7, 116 Cal. Rptr. 575, 578(1974); Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433, 437 (1972).
118. Luque v. McLean, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 139, 501 P.2d 1163, 1165, 104 Cal. Rptr. 443,
445 (1972); Buccery v. General Motors Corp., 60 Cal. App. 3d 533, 542, 132 Cal. Rptr. 605,
610 (1976). The plaintiff need not demonstrate that he was unaware of the defect that caused
his injury at the time of the accident; that is, the defect need not be determined to have been
latent. Id.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
120. See supra text accompanying note 114.
121. Bojorquez v. House of Toys, Inc., 62 Cal. App. 3d 930, 933, 133 Cal. Rptr. 483,
484 (1976); Barth v. B.F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, 244, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306,
315 (1968).
HOTEL STRICT LIABILITY
when wet in order to be shielded from any liability should a guest be
injured in a fall in the tub? The position taken here is that warnings
alone should not be considered sufficient to protect the proprietor
from liability if the injury could have been prevented or lessened by
available safety devices.
A defendant should not be allowed to avoid liability merely by
giving a warning when he has reason to believe that a user will not
heed such a warning.1" It is foreseeable that hotels will have some
guests who are unable to read the warning, including young children
and non-English speaking persons. These guests should, nonetheless,
be provided protection. Moreover, a warning alone does nothing to
alleviate the dangerousness of the situation. For instance, if a person
begins to fall in a bathtub, an available handrail could prevent or
lessen the severity of the injury. In such a situation, the absence or
presence of a warning would be of no benefit once a person is in
peril. Finally, if a hotel owner is permitted to avoid liability merely
by providing a warning, this could act as a disincentive to providing
any safety features.
5. Comparative Fault and Strict Liability Claims
The doctrine of comparative fault has been applied to strict lia-
bility actions, as well as those concerning mere negligence. A plain-
tiff's recovery in strict liability may, therefore, be reduced to the ex-
tent that his own lack of reasonable care contributed to his injury.'
A plaintiff who was injured in a fall in a hotel bathroom due to the
lack of safety features may develop several lines of arguments in an-
ticipation of defenses that are likely to be raised.
The plaintiff may claim that at the time of the injury he was
using the bathroom, or its fixtures, in an intended or anticipated
manner."" This position might be taken, for instance, if the defen-
dant argued that the fall occurred because the plaintiff had left a
soap film in the tub in which he fell. The plaintiff could respond
that even if this were true, his use of soap in the tub was an intended
use and therefore his actions should not serve to reduce recovery.
In addition, a plaintiff may argue that even if his use of the
bathroom or its fixture were a misuse, it was still a reasonably fore-
122. Balido v. Improved Machinery Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 648, 105 Cal. Rptr. 880,
901 (1973).
123. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 742, 575 P.2d 1162, 1172, 144
Cal. Rptr. 380, 390 (1978).
124. See supra text accompanying note 115.
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seeable use.125 This argument might be appropriate, for example, if
the plaintiff had splashed a great deal of water onto the tile floor of
the bathroom, upon which he later slipped. In this situation, he
would argue that the defendant was completely at fault in not pro-
viding a hotel bathroom floor with non-skid surfacing; therefore any
possible misuse should not reduce his recovery.
The plaintiff may also claim that even if his use of the bath-
room or its fixture were not reasonably foreseeable, the "product"
was nonetheless defective because he was not aware of the inherent
danger of the "product" at the time he was using it. 126 This position
might be appropriate if, for example, the plaintiff had been doing
exercises in the bathroom when he slipped. The plaintiff could argue
that the floor was per se defective because of the lack of non-skid
surfacing and therefore he should be entitled to full recovery.
V. CONCLUSION
The slipperiness of slip and fall litigation is the result of the
traditionally onerous proof requirements imposed upon plaintiffs
who bring claims based upon a negligence theory of liability.127 As a
consequence, defendants who should be accountable for their negli-
gence are often absolved of liability, and injured parties are forced to
suffer the resulting inequities.
In the area of slip and fall claims which involve hotel bath-
rooms, strict liability should be imposed upon the proprietors if they
have failed to provide adequate safety features which could have pre-
vented the plaintiff's injuries. A plaintiff would, therefore, only be
required to demonstrate that a defect existed and that such a defect
caused the injury. 2
The application of strict liability would provide an incentive to
hotel proprietors to take adequate measures to protect their guests
from injury. It would also insure that such proprietors are held re-
sponsible for injuries to guests that are caused by an owner's negli-
gent failure to maintain his establishment in a safe condition. 2 The
application of this doctrine would be both appropriate and just and
125. See supra text accompanying note 116.
126. Southern Pacific Co. v. Unarco Industries, Inc., 42 Cal. App. 3d 142, 116 Cal.
Rptr. 847 (1974)..
127. See supra text accompanying notes 35-49.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 68-72 and 119-20.
129. See supra text accompanying note 73.
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should work toward reducing the slipperiness of slip and fall
litigation."1
Geneva Wong Ebisu
130. See supra text accompanying notes 74-96.

